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THE APPLICATION OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENTS ON
TARIFFS AND TRADE TO THE COUNTERTRADE
PRACTICES OF LESS-DEVELOPED AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE GATT
Countertrade' is a trade practice which has experienced a surge
1. "Countertrade" refers to the trade practice whereby a country links the quantity
and/or value of its imports to that of its exports. Lowenfeld, Interface IV: Countertrade in
Economic Relations, 5 J. Comp. Bus. CAP. MARKET L. 329 (1983). Countertrade transactions
arise in a number of different forms. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION DEVEL-
OPMENT, EAST-WEST TRADE: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERTRADE 9 (1981) [here-
inafter cited as OECD]. The types of countertrade transactions discussed in this article are a)
counterpurchase, b) product buy-back, and c) offset. Each of these transactions has its own
type of contractual arrangement and its own distinct set of advantages and disadvantages.
Counter-purchase transactions are often complex and normally involve two mail contracts
and a linking contract or protocol. UN COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/253, paras. 22-24 (1981) [hereinafter cited as UNCITRAL]. In these types of
transactions the primary exporter agrees to purchase goods, at a later time, from the buyer in
some amount proportional to exports. McVey, Countertrade and Barter: Alternative Trade
Financing by Third World Nations, 14 INT'L TRADE L.J. 197, 202 (1981). For example, in
1976 Pepsico contracted to sell a certain quantity of Pepsi to the USSR and agreed to buy, at a
later time, a certain amount of vodka in return. Weigand, International Trade Without Money,
HARV. Bus. REV. Nov.-Dec., 1977 at 28, 34.
Product buy-back transactions are often very complex and require long periods for per-
formance (often 10 to 20 years). Nelson, Countertrade: The Return of Barter, BUSINESS IN-
TELLIGENCE PROGRAM, No. 1025, Dec. 1977, at 1, 3. In these transactions, the primary
exporter sells equipment or an entire plant which is used to manufacture products. Back to
Barter, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 14, 1974, at 53. The importing country will pay for this equip-
ment or plant with the goods the plant or equipment produces. For example, Levi-Strauss
agreed to sell a plant and product designs to Hungary. As payment for the plant and accompa-
nying designs, Levi agreed to take a certain percentage of the product (blue jeans) the plant
manufactured each year. Welt, Countertrade Gains Popularity as an International Trade Tool,
Bus. AM., July 14, 1980, at 12, 15.
In offset agreements, the exporter agrees to obligate itself to take measures, which will
compensate the costs the importing country incurs in buying products. In one example of an
offset arrangement, the primary exporter sells goods to the importing country and, in order to
offset the cost of these goods, agrees to aid in marketing export goods from the importing
country. U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMM'N, Pue. No. 1237, ANALYSIS OF RECENT
TRENDS IN U.S. COUNTERTRADE 9 (1982) [hereinafter cited as USITC]. The advantages of
offset arrangements are that the importing country receives assistance in promoting its goods
and in finding markets abroad, while the primary exporter has a market for its goods. The
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of growth in recent years. 2 Because countertrade deals often go unre-
corded, or otherwise remain secret,3 estimates on the percentage of
world trade covered by countertrade vary from one percent to forty
percent of all international trade.4 Many government trade regula-
tions, mainly those of less-developed and developing countries, re-
quire up to one hundred percent of the value of certain imports to be
paid with products manufactured or produced in their home mar-
ket.5 In 1984 the Colombian government established countertrade as
a special system of its commercial trade.6 In 1981 the government of
Indonesia began requiring those foreign companies awarded con-
tracts with the Indonesian government to export Indonesian prod-
ucts in an amount equivalent in monetary value to the products
imported.7 In 1982 the United States exchanged large amounts of
powdered milk for Jamaican bauxite.8
The recent rise in the use of countertrade has been attributed to
major disadvantage with this type of transaction is that the primary exporter may have to tie up
a significant amount of its marketing resources to fulfill its part of the bargain. Id. at 8-9.
2. WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS REPORT, March 19, 1984, at I [hearinafter
cited as WIBR].
3. Jones, North/South Countertrade: Barter and Reciprocal Trade with Developing Coun-
tries, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT 27 (Special Report No. 147, 1984). Secrecy is only one
of the problems surrounding the making of estimates on the extent of global countertrade. The
fact that definitions of countertrade differ compounds the problems in making such estimates.
Paper Prepared by A.P. Giles, Boodle & King, 22 Grosvenor Square, London, England 1
(1983) (copy on file with California Western International Law Journal).
4. Jones, supra note 3, at 26. A recently released study by the International Trade Com-
mission indicates that of $127 billion in export sales only 5.6% involved sales contracts with an
associated countertrade. U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMM. PUB. No. 332-185, ASSESS-
MENT OF THE EFFECTS OF BARTER AND COUNTERTRADE TRANSACTIONS ON U.S. INDUS-
TRIES, at viii (Oct. 1985).
5. Jones, supra note 3, at 86. Further, the requirements may involve varying degrees or
levels of government intervention. These degrees or levels progress from informal governmen-
tal pressure to import or export licensing schemes. Walsh, Countertrade: Not Just for East-
West Anymore, 18 J. WORLD TRADE L. 3, 6-8 (1984).
6. President of the Republic of Colombia, Decree no. 370, 1984, issued February 15,
1984. This presidential decree set out definitions of countertrade the Republic was to engage
in, and set forth the system by which countertrade was to be used. Presidential Decree no.
1429 of 1984 provided that the requirements set forth in Decree no. 370 may be satisfied either
in goods or services "subject to the rules established in the pertinent parts of said Decree."
Decree no. 1429, 1984, issued June 11, 1984 (Bogata) Colombia. General Resolution no. 504,
1984 of the General Director of the Colombia Institute of Foreign Trade sets forth the require-
ments and procedures for approval of specific countertrade transactions. General Resolution
504, 1984, issued March 29, 1984.
7. McVey, Countertrade: Commercial Practices, Legal Issues and Policy Dilemmas, 16
LAW AND POL'Y INT'L Bus. 3, 10 (1984). Many other countries have also instituted similar
requirements on importers. Jones, supra note 3, at 82-95.
8. Banks, The Economics and Politics of Countertrade, 6 THE WORLD ECONOMY 160
(1983).
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a number of factors. The most significant of these is the shortage of
available hard currency in less-developed and developing countries.9
Some of the other, more significant problems also contributing to the
increase in the use of countertrade are: under-industrialization,'
0
balance of payments deficits, I I and the need to increase foreign mar-
kets for domestically produced goods. 12 As long as these problems
continue, the use of countertrade will remain an integral part of in-
ternational trade. 1
3
Although countertrade has a number of short term advantages
for less-developed and developing countries,' 4 its long term effects on
world trade are more serious and significant.' 5 The major shortcom-
ings most often associated with countertrade transactions are their
inherently discriminatory nature,' 6 their bilateral effect,' 7 the con-
9. McVey, Countertrade and Barter: An Introductory Analysis, Paper prepared for the
American Association of Exporters and Importers 8 (1983) (copy on file with California West-
ern International Law Journal). This shortage in currency is due to the energy problems devel-
oping countries faced in the oil shortages of 1979-1980. Downey, Countertrade, Paper
prepared for the Fall Institute on Current Issues in International Financial Transactions 3
(Oct. 26, 1984) (copy on file with California Western International Law Journal).
10. McVey, supra note 1, at 202. A major effect of the under-industrialization of less-
developed and developing countries is their increasing attempts at promoting exports to stimu-
late industrial growth. Countertrade is viewed by these countries as a means of increasing
exports. Banks, supra note 3, at 166-67. Countertrade is also seen as a means of facilitating
transfers of technology, which in turn stimulates growth of the industrial base. McVey, supra
note 1, at 202.
11. Walsh, supra note 5, at 4.
12. Downey, supra note 9, at 4. The reason for the existence of such needs is that coun-
tries using countertrade to market goods have faced a build-up of protectionism in developed
countries. Id. at 4-5. An equally if not more prominent reason is the inherent deficiencies and
lack of quality in the goods these countries produce. McVey, supra note 9, at 7.
13. USITC, supra note 1, at 9. This report states that the problems which cause the in-
crease in the use of countertrade still exist and that, as long as they do exist, United States firms
should expect to encounter countertrade requirements. It is only when the economic problems
are resolved that the trade "symptoms" will go away. Address by Lionel H. Olmer, Under
Secretary for International Trade, U.S. Department of Commerce, Financial Times Conference
in Washington, D.C., 3, 6-7 (Jan. 24, 1984) (copy on file with California Western International
Law Journal).
14. There are many short term advantages to countertrade. Because a country can pre-
clude paying cash for the goods it imports by using its domestically produced goods, counter-
trade serves to overcome currency shortages while also aiding in the promotion of exports.
Further, by aiding in the promotion of exports, countertrade also helps to increase the coun-
try's industrial base. VERZARIU, INTERNATIONAL COUNTERTRADE: A GUIDE FOR MANAG-
ERS AND EXECUTIVES, at v (1984).
15. Kyung, Countertrade: Trade Without Cash, FIN. & DEV., Dec. 1983, at 14.
16. Countertrade requirements are naturally discriminatory in that certain countries will
impose them on a country or group of countries (due to the resources or technology these
countries may possess) while not imposing the same or similar requirements on other countries
(because these countries do not possess any valuable resource or technology). Czinkota & Tal-
Vol. 16
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stricting effect they have on international trade,'" and the reduction
of available currency necessary to pay foreign debts.' 9
At present, there is no international trade agreement containing
provisions expressly directed at countertrade.2 ° The General Agree-
ments on Tariffs and Trade,2' though designed to deal with the trade
practices of its member States,22 contains no provision expressly con-
cerning countertrade.23 However, because of the many detrimental
and disruptive effects countertrade has on international trade,24 some
of GATT's provisions can be interpreted as applicable.25 Considera-
tion of the basic goals GATT is designed to achieve is necessary to
such an interpretation.
One of the goals of GATT is to reduce the tariff and non-tariff
barriers26 imposed by its signatory nations.27 GATT is also aimed at
bot, GA 77 Regulation of Countertrade. Issues and Prospects, NATIONAL CENTER FOR Ex-
PORT-IMPORT STUDIES, STAFF PAPER No. 20, at 6 (July 1985).
17. WIBR, supra note 2, at 1. Countertrade, because it places obligations on an exporter
and bilateralizes trade, causes paring up of countries on transactions. The problem here is that
the international economic community is striving to free itself of bilateralized trade and replace
bilateralism with a system of multinational trading. Id.
18. Countertrade transactions leave exporters with a second deal to complete; the goods
received as payment must now be marketed and sold. The exporters' ability to generate income
is hindered by the countertrade transaction because they must complete a second transaction
(the countertrade deal). This state of affairs has the effect of tying up the marketing resources
of the exporters. This problem is aggravated by the fact that exporters are often left with goods
of low quality which are difficult to sell. UNCITRAL, supra note 1, at 10; Lowenfeld, supra
note 1, at 330.
19. Suro-Bredie, U.S. Government Views on Countertrade, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE 3, reprinted in, EHRENHAFT, COUNTERTRADE AND TRADING COMPANIES:
TRADE TRENDS IN THE 1980's, at 12 (1984).
The reduction of currency available to pay current debts is an express concern of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF is concerned because currency is not generated
by the sale of a country's goods; where countertrade is involved, the country will face further
difficulty in repaying its foreign debt. Jones, supra note 3, at 41-42.
20. Kyung, supra note 15, at 16. The U.N. Commission report suggests that the complex-
ities involved with countertrade, and the variety of forms they may take, make it difficult to
formulate any type of uniform regulations. UNCITRAL, supra note 1, at 12.
21. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. (5), (6), T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, reprinted in, H.R. Doc. 29-617, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter
cited as GATT].
22. Czinkota & Talbot, supra note 16, at 1.
23. Kyung, supra note 15, at 16.
24. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
25. USSR - Mexico Committee Will Oversee Barter Relations; Compensation Pact Set, II
COUNTERTRADE OUTLOOK, no. 16, at 1, 3, Apr. 23, 1984 [hereinafter cited as CTO].
26. Preamble to GATT, supra note 21, at 1; see also, K. GUPTA, A STUDY OF GENERAL
AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 24 (1967). Tariff barriers are duties which a country
imposes on the imports coming to it from other countries. They are generally used to protect
the domestic market of the country's locally produced goods. Non-tariff barriers are the re-
strictions and obligations imposed on the importation of products (other than tariffs) usually
4
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the promotion of the unconditional most favored nation principle.2"
The basic tenet of this principle is that a State giving special rights
and privileges to one member nation29 must give equal preference to
all other members.30 Other purposes of GATT include raising the
standard of living among its signatories,31 ensuring a steady growth
of real income in these countries,32 and liberalizing world trade.33
Because the provisions of GATT apply only to actions taken by
the governments of its signatories, these provisions will only apply to
transactions involving some form of government intervention.34
Therefore, in order for GATT to apply to a countertrade require-
ment, such a requirement must be imposed by some form of govern-
mental intervention or policy.
35
This Comment will begin with an analysis of GATT's uncondi-
tional most favored nation principle. 36 This discussion will consider
how this principle applies to countertrade's inherently discriminatory
nature. Next, GATT's requirement of publication of trade regula-
tions37 will be considered. An analysis of this provision is included
having the effect of increasing the cost or risk to the exporter. See generally Hufbauer, Erb &
Starr, The GA TT Codes and the Unconditional Most Favored Nation Principle, 12 L. & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 59, 66 (1980).
27. GATT has 85 member nations and 16 de facto members. It is intended to apply to
State practices, not to those of private individuals or corporations (unless the corporation is
State controlled). Gadbaw, The Implications of Countertrade Under the General Agreements on
Tariffs and Trade, 5 J. CoMP. Bus. CAP. MARKET L. 355, 357 (1983). CTO, supra note 25, at
3.
28. GUPTA, supra note 26, at 24.
29. Member State refers to a State that is a signatory or de facto member of GATT.




34. See supra note 27. This becomes especially important with respect to developing
countries since the governments of these countries are often involved in trade. VERZARIU,
supra note 14.
35. Gadbaw, supra note 27, at 357.
36. The basic postulate of the unconditional most favored nation principle is stated in
Article I:
1. With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in
connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer
of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the methods of levying such
duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities connected with im-
portation and exportation ... any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted
by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other coun-
try shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating
in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.
GATT, supra note 21, at 224.
37. The publication requirement is contained in Article X:
1. Laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general
application, made effective by any contracting party, pertaining to the classification or
Vol. 16
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because countries often fail to publish their trade regulations con-
cerning countertrade requirements.38 An analysis of the prohibition
on quantitative restrictions39 will follow.4 Requirements regarding
export subsidies4' will then be discussed.42 This discussion will in-
clude consideration of the ways in which countertrade practices may
constitute export subsidies, thereby potentially violating GATT. Fi-
nally, consideration will be given to the nullification and impairment
the valuation of products for customs purposes, or to rates of duty, taxes or other
charges, or to requirements, the transfer of payments therefor, or affecting their sale,
distribution, transportation, insurance, warehousing, inspection, exhibition, process-
ing, mixing or other use, shall be published promptly in such a manner as to enable
governments and traders to become acquainted with them. Agreements affecting in-
ternational trade policy which are in force between the government or a governmental
agency of any contracting party and the government or governmental agency of any
other contracting party shall also be published. The provisions of this paragraph
shall require any contracting party to disclose confidential information which would
impede law enforcement or otherwise be contrary to public interest or would preju-
dice the legitimate commercial interests of particular enterprises, public or private.
Id. at 238.
38. Where the countertrade requirement is merely an informal type of pressure placed on
a firm, it is likely to go unpublished. Walsh, supra note 5, at 7.
39. Article XI prohibits the use of quantitative restrictions. This Article provides in perti-
nent part:
1. No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes, or other charges,
whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures,
shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any
product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale
for export of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party.
GATT, supra note 21, at 239.
40. Quantitative restrictions are limitations or restrictions placed on the amount of a
product permitted to be imported into a country. COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOP-
MENT, NON-TARIFF DIsTORTIONS OF TRADE (Sept. 1969) [hereinafter cited as CED].
41. Article XVI restricts the use of subsidies. It provides in pertinent part:
2. The contracting parties recognize that the granting by a contracting party of
a subsidy on the export of any product may have harmful effects for other contracting
parties, both importing and exporting, may cause undue disturbance to their commer-
cial interests, and may hinder the achievement of the objectives of this Agreement.
3. Accordingly, contracting parties should seek to avoid the use of subsidies on
the export of primary products. If, however, a contracting party grants directly or
indirectly any form of subsidy which operates to increase the export of any primary
product from its territory, such subsidy shall not be applied in any manner which
results in that contracting party having more than an equitable share of world export
trade in that product account being taken of the shares of the contracting parties in
such trade in the product during a previous representative period....
4. Further, as from 1 January 1958 or the earliest practicable date thereafter,
contracting parties shall cease to grant either directly or indirectly any form of sub-
sidy on the export of any product other than a primary product which subsidy results
in the sale of such product for export at a price lower than the comparable price
charged for the like product to the buyers in the domestic market.
GATT, supra note 21, at 248-49.
42. A full and exact definition of export subsidies was considered by GATT and deter-
mined to be impractical. Low, The Definition of Export Subsidies in GAIT, 16 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 375 n.l (1982). For a general description of what measures may constitute a subsidy
see infra text accompanying notes 161-65.
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provisions of GATT.43 This discussion will focus on how counter-
trade practices may effectively nullify or impair the rights of GATT
signatories. Furthermore, a central part of the analysis of each
GATT article in this Comment will focus on the special considera-
tion GATT gives to less-developed and developing countries."
This Comment will analyze GATT with respect to whether the
countertrade practices of less-developed and developing countries vi-
olate its provisions. It will point out the ambiguities inherent in the
application of GATT to the countertrade requirements of these coun-
tries. A clarification of the ambiguities and conflicts between the ob-
ligations and rights of developed, less-developed, and developing
countries will be provided where possible. Proposed clauses and
amendments will also be offered to resolve these conflicts and ambi-
guities as they are pointed out.
I. ARTICLE I: GENERAL MOST FAVORED NATION
Article I of GATT provides that each nation imposing import
requirements on, or giving preferential treatment to, one member na-
tion, must take the same action with all other countries.45 The pur-
pose of the unconditional most favored nation principle is to replace
the system of preferential treatment with a system of multinational
trade.46 Many agreements subsequent to the formation of GATT
have failed to recognize the unconditional most favored nation prin-
ciple47 or have replaced it with a conditional most favored nation
principle.48 However, there is no indication that any treaty or agree-
43. The nullification and impairment provision of GATT is embodied in Article XXIII:
1. If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it di-
rectly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the
attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the result of
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations under
this Agreement, or
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or
not it conflicts with the provisions of this agreement, or
(c) the existence of any other situation, the contracting party may, with a view
to the satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make written representations
or proposals to the other contracting party or parties which it considers to
be concerned. Any contracting party thus approached shall give sympa-
thetic consideration to the representations or proposals made to it.
GATT, supra note 21, at 261-62.
44. The preferences GATT affords less-developed and developing countries arise under
the provisions of Article XII, infra note 106.
45. Article I, supra note 36.
46. Hufbauer, supra note 26, at 60. See also, GUPTA, supra note 26, at 26.
47. Hufbauer, supra note 26, at 59-60.
48. Id. at 60-61. The conditional most favored nation principle is not a return to bilateral
trade but merely makes the granting of concessions conditional on reciprocal concessions. The
Vol. 16
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ment has completely obviated the force of the most favored nation
requirement.49
The typical countertrade transaction may violate the most fa-
vored nation principle. For example, State X is a less-developed Afri-
can nation having extensive tin reserves. It buys large amounts of
grain from State Y which is a developed country having a vast
amount of marketing technology. In order for State Y to sell grain to
State X, it is required to offset the amount State X pays for the grain
by marketing some of its tin. State X also buys grain from State A,
however, since State A has no special marketing technology, it is not
required to aid State X in the marketing of its tin. The offset require-
ment imposed on State Y is discriminatory since it is not imposed on
State A as well. In this way, the requirement becomes a type of pref-
erential treatment of State A. If all three countries are signatories of
GATT, ° State X has violated the most favored nation provision.
However, GATT affords special preferences to less-developed coun-
tries due to their economic underdevelopment. It is in light of these
preferences that difficulties arise in interpreting the applicability of
the most favored nation provision."1
Many of the preferences afforded to less-developed countries are
set forth in GATT's principles and objectives.52 One important ob-
multilateral nature of the most favored nation principle remains. This is so because all member
nations are free to enjoy preferences by the granting of the requisite condition. Id.
49. GATT Ministerial Declaration on the World Trading System, 22 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 445 (1983). In fact, in 1982 the GATT7 signatories reaffirmed their commitments
under GATT through a declaration adopted by consensus. Id.
50. A country must be a signatory of GATT in order to be subjected to its provisions.
51. The most favored nation provision is reproduced, in pertinent part, supra note 36.
This conflict was also implied in Gadbaw, supra note 27, at 364. See also, Czinkota & Talbot,
supra note 16.
52. These preferences are set out in Article XXXVI which provides in pertinent part:
1. The contracting parties,
(a) recalling that the basic objectives of this Agreement include the raising of
standards of living and the progressive development of the economies of all
contracting parties, and considering that the attainment of these objectives
is particularly urgent for less-developed contracting parties;
(b) considering that export earnings of the less-developed contracting parties
can play a vital part in their economic development and that the extent of
this contribution depends on the prices paid by the less-developed con-
tracting parties for essential imports, volume of their exports, and the prices
received for these exports;
(c) noting, that there is a wide gap between the standards of living in less-
developed countries and in other countries;
(d) recognizing that individual and joint action is essential to further the devel-
opment of the economies of less-developed contracting parties and to bring
about rapid advance in the standards of living in these countries;
(e) recognizing that international trade as a means of achieving economic and
social development should be governed by such rules and procedures and
8
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jective of GATT is to raise the standard of living in less-developed
countries.53 Further, GATT recognizes that joint action of member
countries is necessary to achieve this objective. 4 Countertrade may
aid a country in economic development by promoting that country's
exports" while it also enables that country to acquire goods which it
could not otherwise purchase because of a lack of available cur-
rency.5 6 When the economy of a country develops, its standard of
living should likewise improve. 57  Therefore, by promoting exports
and creating greater access to world goods, countertrade aids in ful-
filling GATT's objective of raising the standard of living of a less-
developed country.5" In this way, according to GATT's principles
and objectives, developed countries should adopt countertrade as a
measure necessary to aid less-developed countries in achieving eco-
nomic development.59
measures in conformity with such rules and procedures as are consistent
with the objectives set forth in this Article;
(f) noting that the contracting parties may enable less-developed contracting
parties to use special measures to promote that trade and development;
agree as follows.
2. There is a need for rapid and sustained expansion of the export earnings of
the less-developed contracting parties.
5. The rapid expansion of the economies of the less-developed parties will be
facilitated by a diversification of the structure of their economies and the avoidance of
an excessive dependence on the export of primary products. There is, therefore, need
for increased access in the largest possible measure to markets under favorable condi-
tions for processed and manufactured products currently or potentially of particular
export interest to less-developed contracting parties.
9. The adoption of measures to give effect to these principles and objectives
shall be a matter of conscious and purposeful effort on the part of the contracting
parties both individually and jointly.
GATT, supra note 21, at 275-76.
53. Id. at para. 1(a).
54. Id. at para. I(d).
55. Countertrade allows a country to acquire a market for goods which face stiff competi-
tion and would otherwise be unmarketable. See also, supra note 12 and accompanying text. In
this way, a country's access to world markets is increased through countertrade. Lowenfeld,
supra note I, at 330.
56. See generally supra note 14 for a discussion of the benefits of countertrade in economic
development. Countertrade allows a country to retain its hard currency, and promote the ex-
portation of domestic products, thereby aiding it in economic development. Banks, supra note
8, at 164-67.
57. The raising of the standard of living of less-developed countries is of primary impor-
tance to GATT. See GATT art. XXXVI, supra note 52, at para. 1(a).
58. Id. at para. 1(b) specifically provides that the "export earnings of the less-developed
contracting parties can play a vital part in their economic development." Id. As stated,
countertrade aids in the promotion of a country's exports, see supra notes 14 and 53-54. In so
doing, countertrade fulfills the objectives set out in this paragraph.
59. GATT's principles and objectives recognize the gap between the standards of living of
these two types of countries. It also recognizes that joint action of the contracting parties is
320 Vol. 16
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One of GATT's commitments requires the developed con-
tracting parties60 to give "active consideration to the adoption of
'other measures' . . to [increase] imports from less-developed CON-
TRACTING PARTIES."'" Further, all signatories are required to
take action to increase the availability of world markets to less-devel-
oped countries.62 In so doing, all nations are required to collaborate
in analyzing the development plans of less-developed countries with a
view toward devising "concrete measures to promote the develop-
ment of export potential."63
Developed countries are required to promote the countertrade
practices of less-developed countries if such practices constitute
"other measures" as contemplated in GATT's commitments sec-
necessary to "further the development of the economies of less-developed contracting parties."
Art. XXXVI, supra note 52, at para. l(d).
60. Contracting parties refers to the members of GATT acting jointly. See Yusuf, "Differ-
ential and More Favourable Treatment". The GATT Enabling Clause, 14 J. WORLD TRADE L.
488 n.1 (1980).
61. These obligations are enumerated in Articles XXXVII and XXXVIII. Article XXX-
VII provides in pertinent part:
3. The developed contracting parties shall:
(b) give active consideration to the adoption of other measures designed to pro-
vide for greater scope for the development of imports from less-developed
contracting parties and collaborate in appropriate international action to
this end;
(c) have special regard to the trade interests of less-developed contracting par-
ties when considering the application of other measures permitted under
this Agreement to meet particular problems and explore all possibilities of
constructive remedies before applying such measures where they would af-
fect essential interests of those contracting parties.
GATT, supra note 21, at 278.
Article XXXVIII provides in pertinent part:
1. The contracting parties shall collaborate jointly, within the framework of
this Agreement and elsewhere, as appropriate, to further the objectives set forth in
Article XXXVI.
2. In particular the contracting parties shall:
(a) where appropriate, take action, including action through international ar-
rangements, to provide improved and acceptable conditions of access to
world markets for primary products of particular interest to less-developed
contracting parties and to devise measures designed to stabilize and im-
prove conditions of world markets in these products including measures
designed to attain stable, equitable and remunerative prices for exports of
such products;
(c) collaborate in analyzing the development plans and policies of individual
less-developed contracting parties and in examining trade and aid relation-
ships with a view to devising concrete measures to promote the develop-
ment of export potential and to facilitate access to export markets for the
products of the industries thus developed....
Id. at 278-79.
62. Article XXXVIII, supra note 61, at para. 2(a).
63. Id. at para. 2(c).
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tion.64 Since countertrade increases the imports from less-developed
countries,65 it is arguably an "other measure" within the meaning of
GATT. This argument is supported by the fact that the Annex to
the commitment provisions states that the "other measures" referred
to might include measures "to encourage consumption of products"
or to introduce "measures of trade promotion.",66 Since countertrade
is a means of promoting a country's products, 67 it falls within the
measures which "encourage consumption" and is a "measure of
trade promotion."
Because of the principles, objectives and commitments of
GATT, an ambiguity arises regarding whether less-developed coun-
tries may impose their countertrade requirements on developed coun-
tries in a discriminatory manner. This ambiguity exists because
other provisions of GATT allow less-developed and developing coun-
tries to take measures which facilitate their economic development
provided that such measures are taken in a non-discriminatory man-
ner.68 By mandating that requirements be applied without discrimi-
nation, and prohibiting deviation from the most favored nation
principles in governmental assistance to economic development, the
ambiguity in GATT concerning the obligations of developed coun-
tries becomes apparent.
69
Authority outside of GATT also indicates that less-developed
countries cannot be discriminatory when they adopt permitted meas-
64. Id.
65. See supra notes 14, 53-55 and accompanying text.
66. The Annex to Article XXXVII paragraph 3(b) provides: "The other measures re-
ferred to in this paragraph might include steps to promote domestic structural changes, to
encourage consumption of particular products, or to introduce measures of trade promotion."
GATT, supra note 21, at 298.
67. See supra notes 14, 55-57 and accompanying text.
68. Aside from Article I's most favored nation provisions, two other provisions of GATT
require that measures taken to promote economic development be employed in a non-discrimi-
natory way. Article XIII requires that quantitative restrictions be applied on a nondiscrimina-
tory basis, and Article XVIII allows countries to deviate from other GATT provisions.
However, paragraph 20 of Article XVIII specifically forbids the use of discriminatory
measures.
69. Article XIII, which prohibits the discriminatory application of quantitative restric-
tions for correcting balance of payments, provides:
1. No prohibition or restriction shall be applied by any contracting party on
the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party or on
the exportation of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting
party, unless the importation of the like product of all third countries or the exporta-
tion of the like product to all third countries is similarly restricted.
GATT, supra note 21, at 243. Article XVIII, which allows for governmental assistance for
economic development, is set out infra note 81.
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ures under one of GATT's exceptions.7" However, the GATT En-
abling Clause7' states that the preferences offered in GATT's
principles, objectives, commitments, and joint action requirements
72
may be inconsistent with the most favored nation principle.73
The Enabling Clause was adopted in recognition of the fact that
less-developed and developed countries need not be treated equally.74
The drafters of the clause believed the developed countries had more
resources, more industry, and stronger economies, and were there-
fore in a better position to carry out international trade than less-
developed countries.75 The Enabling Clause speaks of the preferences
afforded to less-developed and developing countries. However, it
does not refer to any obligations developed countries may have to-
ward less-developed countries.76 Therefore, it does not aid in deter-
mining whether developed countries are obligated to adopt measures
which violate the most favored nation principle.77
In light of the rationale behind the Enabling Clause, however, it
is likely that the obligations of developed countries 78 may be imposed
in a manner inconsistent with the most favored nation principle.
This is true in spite of the fact that other provisions of GATT pro-
hibit the application of economic development measures in a discrim-
inatory fashion. In support of this theory, it is urged that developed
countries have the best resources available to meet the challenge of
increasing exports and promoting the trade of less-developed coun-
tries. Since there is uncertainty about the obligations of developed
countries concerning countertrade and its discriminatory application,
there should be an amendment to the principles, objectives, commit-
ments and joint action requirements to clarify these obligations and
70. CTO, supra note 25, at 4.
71. See generally Yusuf, supra note 60.
72. These joint action requirements are set out in Article XXXVIII, supra note 61. They
relate to those actions which all contracting parties are required to take regarding the economic
development of the less-developed member nations.
73. The Enabling Clause reads in pertinent part: "Notwithstanding the provisions of Ar-
ticle I of [GATT] the contracting parties may accord differential and more favorable treatment
to developing countries, without according such treatment to other contracting parties."
Yusuf, supra note 60, at 488.
74. Id. at 492.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 507.
77. With this, less-developed countries would be permitted to take a wider range of action.
However, the developed countries would not be obligated to accept any measure which violated
GATT provisions.
78. The obligations referred to here are listed in Articles XXXVI-XXXVIII, supra notes
52 and 61.
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preferences. 9 This provision could be modeled after those parts of
the present Enabling Clause which relate to preferences for develop-
ing countries."0 It would thus read:
In light of the objectives of this Agreement, the developed member
States must recognize the right of developing and less-developed
member States to deviate from the most favored nation principle
announced in Article I.
GATT's provision for governmental assistance in economic de-
velopment prohibits deviation from the most favored nation provi-
sions.8" These prohibitions make it clear that such a country cannot
be discriminatory in adopting measures to aid in economic develop-
79. Developing countries called for the promulgation of an enabling clause to provide a
basis in GATT for the clarification of preferences afforded them. See generally Yusuf, supra
note 60, at 487-91.
Such an enabling clause should likewise be provided to clarify the obligations of developed
countries in providing less-developed countries with market access and to promote trade with
these countries.
80. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
81. GATT's provisions for governmental assistance in economic development are embod-
ied in Article XVIII. This Article states in pertinent part:
1. The contracting parties recognize that the attainment of the objectives of the
Agreement will be facilitated by the progressive development of their economies, par-
ticularly of those contracting parties the economies of which can only support low
standards of living and are in the early stages of development.
2. The contracting parties recognize further that it may be necessary for those
contracting parties, in order to implement programmes and policies of economic de-
velopment designed to raise the general standard of living of their people, to take
protective or other measures affecting imports, and that such measures are justified in
so far as they facilitate the attainment of the objectives of this Agreement. They
agree, therefore, that those contracting parties should enjoy additional facilities to
enable them (a) to maintain sufficient flexibility in their tariff structure to be able to
grant the tariff protection required for the establishment of a particular industry, and
(b) to apply quantitative restrictions for balance of payments purposes in a manner
which takes full account of the continued high level of demand for imports likely to
be generated by their programmes of economic development.
4. (a) Consequently, a contracting party the economy of which can only sup-
port low standards of living and is in the early stages of development shall be free to
deviate temporarily from the provisions of the other Articles of this Agreement....
9. In order to safeguard its financial position and to ensure a level of reserves
adequate for the implementation of its programme of economic development, a con-
tracting party coming within the scope of paragraph 4(a) of this Article may, subject
to the provisions of paragraph 10 and 12, control the general level of imports by
restricting the quantity or value of merchandise permitted to be imported; Provided
that the import restrictions instituted, maintained or intensified shall not exceed those
necessary:
(a) to forestall the threat of, or to stop, a serious decline in its monetary
reserves, or
(b) in the case of a contracting party with inadequate monetary reserves, to
achieve a reasonable rate of increase in its reserves.
10. In applying these restrictions, the contracting party may determine their
incidence on imports of different products or classes of products in such a way as to
give priority to the importation of those products which are more essential in light of
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ment. However, since the developed countries are best able to facili-
tate the development needs of less-developed and developing nations,
it follows that the most favored nation principle should not apply to
the obligations imposed on the developed countries. Therefore, this
amendment would only apply to the obligations imposed on devel-
oped countries.
II. ARTICLE X: PUBLICATION AND ADMINISTRATION
OF TRADE REGULATION
GATT's provisions on the publication and administration of
trade regulations require the contracting parties to publish regula-
tions, requirements, and/or prohibitions on imports so that govern-
ments and traders may become acquainted with them. 2 An example
of an unpublished countertrade requirement that violates this provi-
sion is the set of informal requirements Israel imposes on foreign
traders through public pressure.8 3 This "public pressure," however,
is only one way in which countries impose countertrade requirements
without publicizing them. Another method is used by Brazil which
encourages its companies to engage in countertrade and enforces this
requirement by periodically publishing its companies' balances of
trade.84
GATT does not provide any exemptions from the publication
requirement.8 " This is because one of GATT's goals is to develop
and liberalize free trade among its member nations.8 6 By failing to
publish trade regulations and requirements, especially those dealing
with countertrade, other countries face many unexpected burdens.
These countries may not be prepared to overcome the hardship im-
posed by unpublished regulations. If trade regulations go unpub-
lished, importers are unable to gauge their marketing resources in a
its policy of economic development; Provided that the restrictions are so applied as to
avoid unnecessary damage to the commercial interests of any other contracting party.
20. Nothing in the preceding paragraphs of this Section shall authorize any
deviation from Articles I, II, and XIII of this agreement. The provisions to para-
graph 10 of this Article shall be applicable to any restriction under this section.
GATT, supra note 21, at 250-57.
82. These requirements are found in Article X, supra note 37.
83. Walsh, supra note 5, at 7.
84. Id.
85. There is no literature which discusses exceptions for less-developed or developing
countries and no viable argument can be made for one under the present GATT. The liberali-
zation and advancement of free trade are concepts to which secrecy of regulation is, or should
be, foreign.
86. GuPTA, supra note 26, at 26.
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manner which enables them to effectively deal with the marketing
requirements in a particular transaction.
III. ARTICLE XI: QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS
GATT provides an almost complete ban on quantitative restric-
tions.87 A quantitative restriction is a limitation placed on the
amount of goods permitted to be imported into the country imposing
the restriction.88 Specific types of quantitative restrictions include
absolute prohibitions on imports, import quotas, and import licens-
ing schemes.89 The quantitative restrictions imposed on any product,
whether through import licensing schemes,9 ° or "other measures,"9'
are "in principle," prohibited.92
A countertrade requirement may constitute a type of quantita-
tive restriction. 93 Conditioning the granting of an import license on
the acceptance and fulfillment of a countertrade requirement
amounts to a quantitative restriction.94 Such a requirement is an im-
port licensing scheme. 95 These schemes are specifically prohibited by
GATT which disallows restrictions on the importation of any prod-
uct "whether made effective through... import or export licenses." 96
However, import licensing schemes are only one way countertrade
requirements may take the form of a quantitative restriction.
87. G. VERBIT, TRADE AGREEMENTS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 56 (1969). The
prohibition is not complete because of the express GATT provisions permitting limited use of
quantitative restrictions in Article XII.
88. CED, supra note 40, at 15.
89. Art. XI, supra note 39, at para. 2.
90. Import licensing schemes place tremendous administrative strain on governments im-
posing such schemes. This situation places burdens and hardships on exporters having to deal
with the licensing and resultant government administrative problems which themselves lead to
a certain amount of arbitrariness. Because of the arbitrariness associated with licensing, firms
are often unable to project levels of expected trade. BELASSA, THE STRUCTURE OF PROTEC-
TION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 91-92 (1971).
91. This term is found in Art. XI, para. 1. See supra note 39.
92. CTO, supra note 25, at 3. The term "in principle" is used because it is necessary to
look at the spirit of GATT. See generally Czinkota & Talbot, supra note 16. In doing so, it is
easy to see that quantitative restrictions are per se invalid. From this point, it is then necessary
to find express exceptions for the use of quantitative restrictions and if none exist the practice is
strictly prohibited.
93. Liebman, Comment. GA TT and Countertrade Requirements, 18 J. WORLD TRADE L.
252, 254 (1984); Gadbaw, supra note 27, at 361; CTO, supra note 25, at 3.
94. CTO, supra note 25, at 3. Countries often require importers to obtain permission
from the government to import goods. The permission granted is an import license.
95. Import licensing schemes exist where the government of a country conditions the
granting of an import license on the fulfillment of a certain number of requirements. BEtASSA,
supra note 90, at 91-92. See also supra note 91 and accompanying text.
96. Art. XI, supra note 39, at para. 1; Downey, supra note 9, at 34.
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A countertrade requirement will also constitute a quantitative
restriction where it has the effect of limiting the quantity of a product
to be imported.97 This limitation becomes manifest when a firm can
only import a quantity of products the value of which is equal to that
which it can export.98 For example, Ecuador restricts the quantity of
alcohol permitted for import (by a firm or country) to the imported
alcohol's equivalent value in bananas taken or sold in export by that
same firm.99 Such a requirement may amount to a limitation on the
quantity of alcohol permitted to be imported."'° This restriction,
however, may be within a realm of action permitted by GATT.
One of the primary objectives of GATT is the expansion of
world trade.'0 ' Quantitative restrictions were prohibited by GATT
because they were considered to be incompatible with this objec-
tive. 10 2 When a government restricts the amount of a product it will
allow into its country, the expansion of trade is correspondingly re-
stricted.t03 Those importers who sell products to countries requiring
some form of countertrade experience a reduced market as a result of
these restrictions."° These restrictions, however, are often imposed
by countries with weak economies. 1°5 Because of this the provisions
of GATT which grant privileges and exceptions to such countries
must also be considered.
Actions which would otherwise be a violation of the prohibition
on quantitative restrictions may be excused because GATT allows
countries to impose quantitative restrictions for balance of payments
purposes. 0 6 Countries may impose quantitative restrictions if they
97. Liebman, supra note 93, at 254.
98. Id. The inability here often results from the fact that goods required to be exported
are often unmarketable or otherwise difficult to sell. This difficulty has the obvious effect of
limiting the amount that can be marketed and, accordingly, the countertrade requirement lim-
its the amount of import.
99. Walsh, supra note 5, at 6. Note, however, that in the Ecuadoran trade policy, alcohol
is considered a luxury or an "unnecessary" item.
100. It is conceivable that bananas, a commodity, may be easy to sell. However, in a more
practical sphere, if a countertrade requirement is being imposed in an effort to export bananas,
it is likely that a glut or surplus exists on the market.
101. GUPTA, supra note 26, at 88.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. By imposing a countertrade requirement, the importer must tie up resources to meet
the obligations and will thereby lose the use of these resources for completing other, more
conventional sales.
105. The term "weak economies" refers to the economies of less-developed and developing
countries. McVey, supra note 9, at 4-5.
106. Article XII provides in pertinent part:
16
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are needed to safeguard their "external financial position."'0 7 This
exception, however, is subject to limitations.
This provision only allows quantitative restrictions to be im-
posed to forestall threats to, or to increase very low amounts of, mon-
etary reserves."' 8 Where they are imposed under this provision, the
quantitative restrictions must be relaxed as the need for them dimin-
ishes. '09 Thus, imposition of quantitative restrictions is permitted for
1. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article XI, any con-
tracting party, in order to safeguard its external financial position and its balance of
payments, may restrict the quantity or value of merchandise permitted to be imported
subject to the provisions of the following paragraphs of this Article.
2. (a) Import restrictions instituted, maintained or intensified by a con-
tracting party under this Article shall not exceed those necessary:
(i) to forestall the imminent threat of, or to stop a serious decline in its
monetary reserves, or
(ii) in the case of a contracting party with very low monetary reserves, to
achieve a reasonable rate of increase in its reserves.
Due regard shall be paid in either case to any special factors which may be affecting
the reserves of such contracting party or its need for reserves, including, where special
external credits or other resources are available to it, the need to provide for the
appropriate use of such credits or resources.
(b) Contracting parties applying restrictions under sub-paragraph (a) of
this paragraph shall progressively relax them as such conditions im-
prove, maintaining them only to the extent that the conditions specified
in that sub-paragraph still justify their application. They shall elimi-
nate such restrictions when conditions would no longer justify institu-
tion or maintenance under that sub-paragraph.
3. (a) Contracting parties undertake, in carrying out their domestic policies,
to pay due regard to the need for maintaining or restoring equilibrium
in their balance of payments on a sound and lasting basis and to the
desirability of avoiding an uneconomic employment of productive re-
sources. They recognize that in order to achieve these ends, it is desira-
ble so far as possible to adopt measures which expand rather than
contract international trade.
(c) Contracting parties applying restrictions under this Article undertake:
(i) to avoid unnecessary damage to the commercial or economic inter-
ests of any other contracting party;
(ii) not to apply restrictions so as to prevent unreasonably the impor-
tation of any description of goods in minimum commercial quan-
tities the exclusion of which would impair regular channels of
trade....
5. If there is a persistent and widespread application of import restrictions
under this Article, indicating the existence of a general disequilibrium which is re-
stricting international trade, the contracting parties shall initiate discussions to con-
sider whether other measures might be taken, either by those contracting parties the
balances of payments of which are tending to be exceptionally favorable, or by any
appropriate intergovernmental organization, to remove the underlying causes of the
disequilibrium. On the invitation of the CONTRACTING PARTIES, contracting
parties shall participate in such discussions.
GATT, supra note 21, at 240-43.
107. Roessler, The GA 7T Declaration on Trade Measures Taken for Balance of Payments
Purposes, 12 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 383 (1980). See also art. XII, supra note 106, at para. I.
108. Art. XII, supra note 106, at para. 2(a).
109. Roessler, supra note 107, at 383.
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the equalization of balance of payments deficits. °" 0 However, the
type of quantitative restriction that can acutally be imposed is not
clearly explained in GATT."' GATT does provide that restrictions
"which expand rather than contract international trade" are
desirable.' 2
Countertrade places a number of constraints on a country in a
particular transaction,"13 and may contravene the GATT provision
related to the expansion of world trade.' Further, where trade re-
quirements restrict rather than expand international trade, the provi-
sions of GATT require that the application of other measures should
be sought.' In light of this, if other methods are available which
have a less restrictive effect on international trade, and if they may be
practically adopted, they should be given preferential application
over other more restrictive trade practices like countertrade."
6
GATT provides that the "[c]ontracting parties applying restric-
tions... undertake... to avoid unnecessary damage to the commer-
cial or economic interests of any other contracting party.""' 7 In the
Ecuadoran countertrade requirement," 8 this provision applies where
a country exporting alcohol to Ecuador could not dispose of a sub-
stantial amount of Ecuadoran bananas but had an abundance of its
own alcohol available for sale." 9 In that example, the economic in-
terests of the exporting country would be damaged since it would not
be able to satisfy the countertrade requirement.' 20 There may, how-
ever, be alternative measures of which GATT would be more
tolerant.
The contracting parties prefer the use of surcharges over trade
110. By using goods rather than currency to buy imports, a country will thereby retain the
currency it would otherwise have to expend. Thus, through the use of countertrade, a country
can equalize the amount of money it pays out with the amount it takes in. The value of the
goods received through countertrade is considered payment for the goods exported. The goods
imported are thus treated as income for those exported. Consequently the balance of payments
becomes equalized by these transactions.
111. Art. XII, supra note 106.
112. Id. at para. 3(a).
113. See supra notes 1, 15-18 and accompanying text.
114. Art. XII, supra note 106, at para. 3(a).
115. Id. Paragraph 3(a) states that measures which expand world trade should be applied
wherever possible.
116. Id.
117. Id. at para. 3(c)(i).
118. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
119. Walsh, supra note 5, at 6.
120. This results from the failure of the exporter to generate revenue from alcohol sales
which would in turn stimulate its economy.
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restrictions in correcting balance of payments deficits. 1 21 There are
many reasons for this preference. Surcharges have a less disruptive
effect on international trade than do quantitative restrictions.' 2 2 Fur-
ther, the administration of surcharges is less complex than the ad-
ministration of certain types of quantitative restrictions;' 23 and the
revenue from surcharges goes directly to the country imposing
them.' 24  In addition, surcharges are preferred because some coun-
tries using quantitative restrictions may realize windfall profits while
others lose out in the transaction.' 2 5 Since surcharges have a less
disruptive effect on international trade, less-developed and develop-
ing countries find them more readily accepted by other GATT mem-
bers than either countertrade requirements or some other, more
restrictive measure. 126  In light of the foregoing, it appears that
GATT would be more tolerant of surcharges than of quantitative
restrictions. GATT's provisions granting privileges to certain mem-
bers and exceptions to certain obligations, however, permit the use of
quantitative restrictions, not surcharges, for the purpose of cor-
recting balance of payments problems.' 2 7
Countertrade requirements, while potentially a form of quantita-
tive restriction, may be permitted if applied to safeguard or correct
balance of payments deficits.'2 8 GATT, however, presents a further
limitation in its provision allowing the use of quantitative restrictions
for balance of payments purposes. It states that "[i]f there is a persis-
121. Vincke, Trade Restrictions for Balance of Payments Reasons and the GA TT. Quotas v.
Surcharges, 13 HARV. INT'L L.J. 289, 291-92 (1972).
122. The disruptive effect of quantitative restrictions is caused by a number of factors
which are produced when a country imposes schemes which themselves amount to quantitative
restrictions. These include:
1. A sharp increase, or potential increase, of imports from particular sources;
2. These products are offered at prices which are substantially below those prevail-
ing for similar goods of comparable quality in the market of the exporting country;
3. There is a serious damage to domestic products or threat thereof;
4. Price differentials referred to in paragraph [ii] above do not arise from govern-
mental intervention....
VERBIT, supra note 87, at 58-59.
123. Vincke, supra note 121, at 312-13.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 291-92.
127. Roessler, supra note 107, at 388. Article XII, supra note 106, and Article XVIII,
supra note 81, speak only in terms of using quantitative restrictions not surcharges. Id. These
are the only provisions in GATT which expressly permit the imposition of quantitative restric-
tions. Other provisions could, however, be construed as allowing the use of quantitative re-
strictions, such as Article XVIII, supra note 81; Article XXXVI, supra note 52; and Articles
XXXVII-XXXVIII, supra note 61.
128. CTO, supra note 25, at 3.
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tent and widespread application of import restrictions ... which is
restricting international trade ... the CONTRACTING PARTIES
shall initiate discussions to consider what other measures might be
taken."' 29 According to the language of this provision, the restric-
tive nature of countertrade, and the detrimental effect it has on inter-
national trade, may make it unavailable as a corrective measure for
overcoming balance of payments problems. 130
However, Article XII's balance of payments provision is only
one of the GATT exceptions less-developed and developing countries
may use to justify their adoption of quantitative restrictions.
GATT's provisions relating to governmental assistance to economic
development may also allow a country to apply quantitative restric-
tions in order to safeguard its balance of payments.' 31 It is arguable
that the equalization of balance of payments is not, however, the only
purpose to which a quantitative restriction, specifically countertrade,
may be applied.' 32
GATT states that its aims would be facilitated by progressive
development of the economies of the contracting parties and particu-
larly those countries "with low standards of living .. in the early
stages of economic development."'' 33 Further, protective or "other
measures" affecting imports may be taken in order to implement pro-
grams of economic development. 134 GATT's provision for govern-
mental assistance allows a country with a low standard of living to
impose quantitative restrictions for developmental purposes. 135 It fur-
ther provides that any restrictions must be imposed in such a way
that unnecessary damage to the commercial or economic interests of
the contracting parties is avoided.' 36 It is therefore unclear whether
countertrade requirements could be imposed as quantitative restric-
tions under the assertion that they would further the developmental
purposes of less-developed and developing countries. This is because
129. Art. XII, supra note 106, at para. 5.
130. The measures considered by the contracting parties collectively under paragraph 5 are
similar to those which should be taken into consideration by the country imposing the quanti-
tative restriction when it makes the initial determination to impose the quantitative restriction
under paragraph 3 of Article XII. See also, supra note 115 and accompanying text.
131. Art. XVIII, supra note 81.
132. Whether surcharges may be tolerated under GATT for these purposes, is not within
the scope of this Comment.
133. Art. XVIII, supra 81, at para. 1.
134. Id. at para. 2.
135. GOLT, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT SYSTEM 25 (1978). This is a notable
extension beyond the use of quantitative restrictions solely to overcome difficulties with balance
of payments.
136. Art. XVIII, supra note 81, at para. 10.
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countertrade has a twofold effect. Though countertrade may help a
country developmentally, 137 it may also damage the economic inter-
ests of other contracting parties.'
3 1
Countertrade often requires an exporter to take goods from the
country to which it exports as payment for those products it sells to
that country. 139 As a result of this requirement, the exporter may be
left with goods for which no market exists due to, among other
things, their poor quality or overabundance." ° The exporter may
then end up flooding a market with products at a greatly reduced
price."'4 Countertrade may also occur in the form of a country man-
dating that exporting countries aid in marketing the goods of the
less-developed or developing countries.' 42 In this case, the exporter
is required to tie up resources which would otherwise be used to gen-
erate income. 143 Consequently, countertrade requirements may be
damaging to the economies of the exporting country or, in some
cases, of a third country."' While aiding in a country's develop-
ment, thereby fulfilling the developmental objective of GATT,
countertrade also upsets the trade position of other nations. This ul-
timately undercuts GATT's objective of protecting the economic in-
terests of its member nations. 14
The provision for exceptions, the limitations placed on these ex-
ceptions, and their interrelation with the objectives of GATT make
137. These benefits are described supra note 14.
138. Countertrade may result in a country dumping its exports where such actions would
not normally be possible. Suro-Bredie, supra note 19, at 3. Also, countertrade may lead to
discrimination and distortion. Id.
139. Nelson, supra note 1, at 3.
140. UNCITRAL, supra note 1, at 10.
141. Banks, supra note 8, at 176-77. The problems surrounding this situation become man-
ifest when the products which flood the market are generally produced in the exporter's own
country.
142. USITC, supra note 1, at 8-9. This is a common type of offset requirement.
143. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
144. This is damaging to a country's economy for two reasons. First, although a deal is
being made that may not have otherwise occurred, the exporter is unable to generate new
income because of the obligations arising from the offset or other related requirements. See
supra note 1 for a description of what these obligations entail. Second, the exporter may even-
tually end up selling the goods in its own domestic market at prices lower than the prevailing
market rate, as discussed supra note 128.
The damage to a third country would result where the exporter, rather than sell the goods
in its home market, sells them in the market of other countries (a practice commonly referred
to as switch trading). This practice may be restricted by the country imposing the offset where
it has a market in those countries where the exporter attempts to execute such sales.
145. These economic interests are outlined by Gupta as centering around developing the
full use of the resources of the world, and expansion of production and international trade.
GUPTA, supra note 26, at 24.
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the applicability of the governmental assistance provision unclear
with respect to the countertrade requirements (in the form of quanti-
tative restrictions) of less-developed and developing countries. In the
governmental assistance provision,"' as in the balance of payments
provision,' 47 limitations are placed on exceptions to less-developed
and developing countries in order to protect the economic and com-
mercial interests of other countries as well as world trade.148 The
restrictive nature of countertrade, coupled with the benefits it affords
those less-developed and developing countries engaging in the prac-
tice, make it difficult to ascertain how the provisions allowing gov-
ernmental assistance in economic development apply. 149 There is no
provision explaining whether meeting developmental needs should
take precedence over expanding trade.1 i 0
The preferences and exceptions afforded less-developed and de-
veloping countries by GATT's provisions for governmental assist-
ance and balance of payments, add fuel to the fire of ambiguity in
light of the obligations placed on developed countries under GATT's
principles, objectives, commitments, and joint action require-
ments. 1 ' The problem of interpreting the obligations these other
provisions impose on developed countries lies in determining whether
developed countries must accept the countertrade requirement of a
less-developed or developing country as one of the "other measures"
contemplated in these provisions. 52 The instances of some form of
governmentally mandated countertrade continue to increase.15 3
There is therefore a corresponding increase in the need to clarify the
application of the exceptions in the articles of GATT for underdevel-
oped nations in the use of countertrade as a quantitative presentation.
146. Art. XVIII, supra note 81.
147. Art. XII, supra note 106.
148. GUPTA, supra note 26, at 148-56.
149. Id. The problem is made clear in the following argument: When countertrade is used,
while potentially causing disruption in the world market and some injury to the countries upon
which it is imposed, the countries that engage in countertrade will develop. With the develop-
ment of these countries, all other countries will eventually benefit. Therefore, though there are
short term harms, there are long term gains that will compensate for such harms. Id.
150. There is no indication in Article XVIII that the objective of meeting the developmen-
tal needs of less-developed and developing countries should be accorded priority over the objec-
tive of expanding world trade, or vice-versa.
GUPTA, supra note 26, at 26, indicates that the most fundamental objective of GATT is
the expansion of world trade. He also notes, however, that restrictive trade practices are essen-
tial to the development of developing countries. He then goes on to say that the objective of
expanding world trade is not valid "in the context of the less developed countries." Id.
151. See art. XXXVI, supra note 52, and arts. XXXVII-XXXVIII, supra note 61.
152. See supra notes 46-80 and accompanying text.
153. See text accompanying notes 2-8.
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A provision or amendment should be added to Article XI to
ensure that restrictive measures taken by less-developed and develop-
ing countries do not violate GATT. This provision should read:
1. Any action taken under another Article of this Agreement
shall not be considered to violate this Agreement provided:
a) That such action is taken to further the objective sought
to be promoted by the Article under which it is taken;
and
b) That the action is taken in full accordance with the provi-
sions of that Article.
2. Where the action is taken by a less-developed or developing
member State, the developed member States must facilitate the
success of such action pursuant to Articles XXXVI-XXXVIII.
The terms of this amendment would clarify the application of
the provisions relating to governmental assistance and balance of
payments and their relation to GATT's principles, objectives, com-
mitments, and joint action requirements. Action of underdeveloped
nations which would otherwise violate Article XI would be permitted
as long as it is taken pursuant to the objectives of the relevant article.
Further, the obligations of developed member States would be clari-
fied under the facilitation requirement of paragraph 2.
IV. ARTICLE XVI: SUBSIDIES
Article XVI provides that subsidies should be avoided.' 54 If
subsidies are used, they must not increase the market for a country's
products beyond the share that country would have had if the subsi-
dies had not been used.' 55 GATT's subsidies provisions further state
that no country should grant a subsidy which results in the sale of a
product for export at a price lower than that for which it is sold in
the domestic market. 56 Limitations are placed on the use of subsi-
dies because of the detrimental effects they have on world markets. 57
The general objection to the use of subsidies is directed at the
154. Subsidies may take form in a number of different ways including direct financial assist-
ance, tax remission programs or tax reimbursment, foreign exchange retention schemes, and
multiple exchange rates. GUFrA, supra note 26, at 132.
155. Art. XVI, supra note 41, at para. 2.
156. Id. at para. 3.
157. These effects include the dumping of goods into a country at prices lower than prevail-
ing market rates. This dumping has the effect of increasing the competitiveness of a product
solely as a result of government intervention. The full use of available resources for producing
these goods is correspondingly limited or decreased.
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distorting effect they have on world market prices."' 8 This distortion
becomes manifest when a government subsidy allows an exporter to
reduce the price of its product as a result of factors outside the influ-
ence of natural market forces.' 5 9 It is the relief from a tax or the
grant of a tax credit, among other things, that causes a reduction in
the market price of the subsidized product and not any influence cre-
ated by the market.160 One example of a countertrade practice con-
stituting a subsidy and illustrating this objection is Indian export
promotion.161 India allows credits, grants licenses, and reduces taxes
on companies which promote exports through countertrade. t62 The
market price of the products exported by such companies is distorted
because it is reduced'63 as a result of government grants not because
of any factor relating to the product's quality or competitiveness. 
164
A specific objection to subsidies is that they cause products to
enter the market at reduced prices and compete with products from
other countries not granting subsidies. 165 This violates GATT's pro-
hibition on subsidies because the subsidy causes products to enter a
market at artificially reduced prices. 166 GATT's provisions on subsi-
dies are further violated if the reduced price caused by the subsidy
creates a greater market for the product. 16 ' This is because GATT
expressly prohibits utilizing a subsidy which has this effect.
168
In analyzing the application of GATT's subsidy provision to
less-developed and developing countries, it becomes necessary to dis-
tinguish between compensatory export subsidies and pure export sub-
158. Schwartz & Harper, The Regulation of Subsidies Affecting International Trade, 70
MICH. L. REV. 831 (1972).
159. The most obvious natural market force is basic supply and demand. Another such
market force is centered around the quality of the subsidized product and its corresponding
competitiveness.
160. For a good discussion of how subsidies distort trade and may operate as a corrective
measure for economic development, see Shwartz & Harper, supra note 158, at 831-32.
161. Walsh, supra note 5, at 7.
162. Id.
163. The reduction on the price of goods results from the granting of relief from taxes or
the granting of other privileges.
164. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
165. Schwartz & Harper, supra note 158, at 840.
166. The specific provision of GATT which is violated in such a situation is Article XVI,
paragraph 4, supra note 41.
167. The language of paragraph 3, in this regard, is mandatory. See supra note 41, at para.
3.
168. Id. Article XVI, paragraph 3 expressly prohibits the granting of subsidies when doing
so has the effect of causing the subsidized product to have a greater market share than would
otherwise exist.
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sidies. 169 Compensatory export subsidies involve grants by a country
to its domestic suppliers to alleviate the existing internal governmen-
tal pressure which reduces the competitiveness of domestic prod-
ucts.' 7 0 Such a subsidy has the effect of easing this internal burden
thereby reducing the costs to the supplier arising from the internal
governmental pressure.'' A pure export subsidy, on the other hand,
is granted to an exporter merely as an aid or incentive to export.'72
No internal government controls or restrictions having an effect on
the market price of the subsidized product are being imposed.' 73 The
subsidy is granted solely to decrease costs to the seller and aid in his
venture to export. 1
74
It is the pure form of export subsidy that GATT seeks to reduce
or eliminate. 75 This is because the pure subsidy causes a reduction
in price, and a correspondingly greater market for subsidized prod-
ucts, without fully utilizing available resources. 176 With the reduc-
tion or elimination of pure subsidies, prices remain economically
competitive without being distorted by government policies.
177
It is difficult to determine whether a countertrade practice
which takes the form of a subsidy, like the Indian countertrade re-
quirement, 78 is permitted under GATT's exceptions for less-devel-
oped or developing countries. This difficulty arises when the
restrictions on the application of subsidies are analyzed in light of the
preferences and exemptions given to less-developed and developing
countries. Countertrade may cause a reduction in the market price
of the product countertraded 17 and may also increase the market
share of the traded product beyond that which it would have had
169. VERBIT, supra note 87, at 149.
170. Id. For example, where a tax is imposed on domestically manufactured products,
such a tax may reduce the competitiveness of those products. The competitiveness of the prod-
uct is reduced because the price is higher as a result of the tax, whereas, the price of products
coming from countries not imposing such taxes will be correspondingly lower. Id.
171. This is accomplished simply by lifting governmental restraints on domestic products.
Id.




176. Schwartz & Harper, supra note 158, at 840.
177. GUPTA, supra note 26, at 132.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 161-62.
179. This reduction may be due to the need for the exporter to market the goods of that
country. Because of this necessity, the exporter must reduce the prices of the goods to meet the
burden of marketing them. See also, supra note 144.
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otherwise. 8 ° Clearly such a practice would violate the prohibition
on subsidies.' 8 ' The countertrade practice may, however, also aid
that country in its quest for economic development, 182 and in so do-
ing, fulfill the objectives, principles and commitments of GAIT. 8 3
Arguably, less-developed and developing countries could grant
subsidies by availing themselves of GATT's provisions regarding
governmental assistance in economic development. 84 In so doing,
these countries could take actions which otherwise violate their obli-
gations under GATT. 185 This provision recognizes the need for the
economic development of countries having a low standard of liv-
ing"'86 by permitting them to temporarily deviate from other provi-
sions of GATT.'87 It is not clear, however, whether these deviations
can be made from obligations other than those relating to restrictive
practices. 18 8 Since subsidies are distorting and potentially damaging,
but are not restrictive, this ambiguity must be considered. 181
Most of the provisions relating to governmental assistance are
couched in terms of relief from prohibitions regarding restrictive
practices.' 90 Where countertrade is used as a subsidy, and not a re-
strictive trade measure, it is not certain whether developing countries
can aver to the governmental assistance provision for an exemption
from their obligations under GATT. 9 '
180. This may be because the countertraded goods are unmarketable and, were it not for
the countertrade requirement, would go unsold.
181. Art. XVI, supra note 41.
182. See supra notes 1 and 14.
183. See supra notes 52 and 61.
184. Art. XVIII, supra note 81.
185. GUPTA, supra note 26, at 148.
186. Art. XVIII, supra note 81, at para. 1.
187. Id. Paragraph 4 allows countries to deviate temporarily from the other provisions of
GATT, such as Article XVI, supra note 41.
188. Restrictive practices, as discussed here, include import quotas, tariffs and import li-
censing schemes.
189. See supra notes 160-65 and accompanying text.
190. The provisions of Article XVIII, supra note 81, allow for exceptions to prohibitions on
quantitative restrictions. The emphasis behind the Article XVIII provisions is the economic
development of developing countries. This emphasis recognizes that trade restrictions are "al-
most indispensible for developing countries." GUPTA, supra note 26, at 26. Gupta further
points out that the contracting parties, in granting these concessions, recognized the need of
developing countries to take measures affecting imports. Id. at 26-27. It is therefore likely that
the contracting parties intended developing countries to take restrictive measures to aid in
development, but not to facilitate this objective through subsidies or other "non-restrictive
methods."
191. Article XVIII, para. 13, supra note 81, allows a country to impose trade measures in
order to increase a standard of living. Paragraph 14 of the same article, however, in referring
to paragraph 13 speaks in terms of imports and measures taken affecting them. The foregoing
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This provision or an amendment attached thereto, should clarify
whether the deviations permitted relate solely to restrictive trade
practices or are permitted for all the practices sought to be extin-
guished by GATT.'92 It is arguable that the governmental assistance
provision is only intended to apply to restrictive or protective meas-
ures designed to aid a country in economic development.' 93 This is
because the contracting parties recognized that the economic devel-
opment of countries entitled to invoke the provisions for government
assistance would best be realized through "protective or other meas-
ures affecting imports."' 94 The amendment or provision should indi-
cate that the Article does not apply to the use of subsidies. It would
read thus:
The deviations permitted under the provisions of this Article re-
late only to those Articles of this Agreement which relate to re-
strictive trade practices, including, but not limited to, quantitative
restrictions, tariffs, and import licenses. Such deviations shall not
include measures affecting exports from the country taking advan-
tage of the deviation.
Where the countertrade requirement of a less-developed country
(resulting in subsequent benefits to private corporations) is imposed
on a developed country, determining the application of GATT's pro-
visions is again unclear.' 95 GATT's objectives, principles, commit-
ments and joint action requirements impose particular obligations on
developed contracting parties.' 96 These obligations include taking
measures which aid in the economic development of less-developed
countries. 197 An analysis of the obligations of developed countries
and of the privileges afforded less-developed countries discloses ambi-
guities regarding the use of subsidies by less-developed countries.
There is no passage in the provisions relating to GATT's objec-
tives, principles, commitments and joint action requirements specify-
ing that developed countries must accept or promote a subsidy as a
discussion of subsidies demonstrates that subsidies effect and relate to exports. Paragraph 19
relates to the imposition of measures to promote an industry, which appears to address subsi-
dies and therefore permit them. Upon close scrutiny it appears that this paragraph also relates
only to the use of restrictive measures. It is important to recognize that these provisions relate
to, and apparently limit, what otherwise appears to be a blanket consent to deviation in para-
graph 3 of Article XVIII.
192. In light of the discussion, supra note 190, this provision should limit the applicability
of the Article XVIII exceptions to restrictive trade practices.
193. GUPTA, supra note 26, at 148.
194. Id. at 148-49. Again, subsidies affect exports not imports.
195. Art. XXXVI, supra note 52. Arts. XXXVII-XXXVIII, supra note 61.
196. See supra notes 52 and 61.
197. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
Vol. 16
27
Rieu: The Application of the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade to
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1986
APPLICATION OF GATT TO COUNTERTRADE
measure designed to aid less-developed countries.' 98 This deficiency
makes it difficult to determine whether a developed country must ac-
quiesce in a less-developed country's countertrade practices which
constitute pure export subsidies. In analyzing the terms of the objec-
tives, principles, commitments and joint action requirements, devel-
oped countries are obligated to take "appropriate action" for
providing "improved and acceptable conditions of access to world
markets for primary products of particular interest to less-developed
contracting parties."'
199
Where countertrade takes the form of a subsidy providing coun-
tries with increased access to world markets,2" it constitutes the type
of "appropriate action" contemplated in GATT's joint action re-
quirements.2' Thus, developed countries would not only be obli-
gated to acquiesce in a less-developed country's use of countertrade,
they would be required to take measures to aid in its promotion!
2°2
A provision or amendment to GATT's objectives, principles, obliga-
tions and commitments should describe what type of measures the
contracting parties intended developed countries to adopt in order to
aid less-developed countries in economic development. The Annex
to Article XXXVII aids in the determination of what measures less-
developed and developing countries may adopt.20 3 In light of this
description the amendment should include subsidies but limit their
use in light of the other GATT objectives. This will clarify whether
subsidies and, more specifically countertrade are considered as in-
tended measures along with the acceptance and promotion of restric-
tive trade practices.
V. ARTICLE XXIII: NULLIFICATION AND IMPAIRMENT
GATT's nullification and impairment provision, when viewed in
light of the obligations and exceptions for less-developed and devel-
198. This Article states the obligations of countries in general. However, the obligations of
developed countries are not mentioned or specified in Article XVI nor is any reference made to
obligations arising under Articles XXXVI-XXXVIII.
199. The material appearing in quotes is taken from Article XXXVIII, supra note 61.
200. This increase may be due to the marketing of otherwise unmarketable goods, or from
affirmative actions taken by developed countries to aid in providing such access by participat-
ing in the practice. See supra note 162.
201. See supra note 61.
202. The provisions giving rise to such obligations are found in Articles XXXVII, para.
3(b) and XXXVIII, para. 2(c), supra note 61. Such a requirement may involve subsidies other-
wise prohibited by Article XVI, supra note 41.
203. In light of the language in the Annex to Article XXXVIII, supra note 64, subsidies
may be specifically provided for as a "measure of trade promotion."
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oping countries, creates a number of difficulties in interpreting the
respective obligations of member States regarding countertrade
agreements. 2" This Article provides that where a country considers
that
any benefit accruing to it ... under this agreement is being nulli-
fied or impaired or ... impeded as the result of ... (a) failure of
another party to carry out its obligations under this agreement, or
(b) the application .. . of any measure whether or not it conflicts
with the provisions of this agreement, or (c) the existence of any
other situation ... [such] country may take the matter up with the
CONTRACTING PARTIES... who will make a ruling on the
matter.205
This clause was placed in GATT as a "catch all" provision.20 6
It is designed to protect countries from any measure that may nullify
or impair their rights and privileges. 2 7 The nullification and impair-
ment provision is an attempt to deal with the unreasonable trade
practices of some of the contracting parties.20 8 It is, however, inter-
nally ambiguous. This provision presents two relatively defineable
situations20 9 delineating when the remedies called for in the Article
may be invoked.2 t0 First, it provides that the remedies may be in-
voked when a country fails to carry out its obligations under
GATT.21 t Second, it invokes remedies when a country carries out a
measure which nullifies or impairs the rights or privileges of any
other contracting party "whether or not it conflicts with the provi-
sions of this Agreement. ' 21 2 It then provides the ambiguous "omni-
bus" term that is broad in scope and vague in meaning and
application.213 Exactly what situations are to be covered by the term
"other measure" is not evident.21 4 Further, there is no provision spe-
cifically stating which types of trade measures or trade requirements
204. Art. XXIII, supra note 43.
205. GATT, supra note 21, at 260-61 (emphasis added).
206. Hudec, Retaliation Against "Unreasonable" Foreign Trade Practices: The New Section
301 and GATTNullification and Impairment, 59 MINN. L. REV. 461, 461-63 (1975).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Art. XXIII, supra note 43, at para. 1(a) and (b).
210. Hudec, supra note 206, at 462-63. When either of these two situations occurs the
country must enter into consultations with the contracting parties to explain why the provi-
sions are being violated, in other words, why measures have been taken which are nullifying or
impairing the rights and privileges of other countries. Id.
211. Art. XXIII, supra note 43, at para. 1(a). Previous discussions indicate, however, that
it may be unclear what these obligations are.
212. Id. at para. 1(b).
213. Id. at para. 1(c).
214. Hudec, supra note 206, at 464.
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constitute a valid basis for nullification or impairment of a right or
privilege.215 This is an especially important consideration to a coun-
try mandating a countertrade requirement since such a requirement
could fall under any one of the three paragraphs in the nullification
and impairment provision.
Where a countertrade requirement violates the most favored na-
tion principle,2 16 constitutes a quantitative restriction2" 7 or takes the
form of a direct government subsidy,2 ' the country imposing such a
requirement may be failing to carry out its obligations under
GATT.219 These activities fall within the purview of the first provi-
sion of GATT's nullification and impairment Article.220 Where the
countertrade requirement does not violate any of the articles of
GATT,221 it may still fit within the second provision if it nullifies or
impairs the rights and privileges accruing to another contracting
party.222 This is because that provision allows application regardless
of whether the measure violates any other article of GATT.2 23 If the
countertrade requirement does not fall within either of these catego-
ries, its mandate may be considered as the "existence of any other
situation" as contemplated by the third provision of the nullification
and impairment Article.224
The exceptions afforded less-developed and developing countries
complicate the applicability of the nullification and impairment pro-
visions to the countertrade requirements of these countries. Because
of these exceptions, it is not clear whether less-developed and devel-
oping countries may be permitted to take actions that "nullify or im-
pair" a country's benefits under GATT. For example, when India
imposes its licensing scheme to promote its countertrade, 225 it may be
nullifying the importer's rights to free trade without the hinderance
215. Parties are merely entitled to consultation when they consider that the benefits accru-
ing to them from the provisions of the Agreement are being nullified or impaired.
216. See supra note 36.
217. See supra note 37.
218. See supra note 106.
219. These obligations arise under Articles I, XI, and XVI respectively. Again, however,
the mere invocation of any one of these practices may not, of itself, be a violation of a specific
obligation.
220. Art. XXIII, supra note 43, at para. l(a).
221. This may be the case if the requirement is excused or exempted by the articles of the
agreement providing preferences.
222. Art. XXIII, supra note 43, at para. l(b).
223. Id. at para. 1(c).
224. Id.
225. Walsh, supra note 5, at 7.
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of quantitative restrictions.226 By requiring countertrade participa-
tion before a license will be issued, India is restricting the importa-
tion of products by the other contracting parties.
GATT allows less-developed and developing countries to apply
restrictions in order to safeguard their balance of payments.227 The
provision which grants this exception to the prohibition on quantita-
tive restrictions, however, limits the occasions when such actions are
permitted. Restrictions can only be applied to the extent necessary to
correct balance of payments problems.228  Also, these restrictions
must be gradually reduced as the need for them dissipates.229
The nullification and impairment provision appears to further
limit the availability of quantitative restrictions. However, whether
quantitative restrictions can be imposed to correct balance of pay-
ments problems, even if doing so would result in the "nullification or
impairment" of the benefits of GATT, is not clearly articulated in
that provision. A developing country may impose a countertrade re-
quirement which causes an exporter to ship a smaller quantity or
value of products than without the requirement. 230 For example, the
Ecuadoran countertrade requirement 231 may cause an exporter to
ship a smaller quantity of alcohol because he can only market a cer-
tain amount of bananas.232 This results in an impairment of the ben-
efits accruing to the exporter because the countertrade requirement
restricts the exporter's ability to export the amount of alcohol avail-
able.233 It is therefore not evident from the provisions of GATT
whether the nullification and impairment provision takes precedence
over the provisions exempting quantitative restrictions for balance of
payments purposes.
It must again be noted that GATT also allows less-developed
and developing countries to deviate from their obligations in order to
facilitate economic and commercial development through govern-
226. This nullification exists when the exporter must comply with the countertrade require-
ment, whereas, if the prohibitions on quantitative restrictions provided in Article XI, supra
note 39, were adhered to, the exporter would not have to do so.
227. Article XII, supra note 106, at paras. 1 and 2.
228. Id. at para. 2(a).
229. Id. at para. 2(b).
230. See supra note 178.
231. Walsh, supra note 5, at 6.
232. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
233. If the prohibition on quantitative restrictions were adhered to, the exporter would be
able to ship all the alcohol he could deliver rather than be restricted in this quantity by his
ability to market bananas.
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mental assistance.234 In analyzing the provisions regarding govern-
mental assistance for economic development, it is uncertain whether
a country can deviate from GATT to facilitate economic develop-
ment when such deviations also "nullify or impair" benefits accruing
to other contracting parties. 235 Here, as with the exceptions for bal-
ance of payments purposes, no provision is made concerning whether
the nullification and impairment provision takes precedence over
those provisions relating to exceptions for governmental assistance.
This deficiency makes the ambiguity of rights and obligations more
pronounced since the nullification and impairment provision pros-
cribes actions which "nullify or impair . . .[rights] whether or not
they conform to the other Articles of [the] Agreement., 236 Thus, an
offset requirement may be permissible as a measure of governmental
assistance in order to facilitate economic development. If it "nullifies
or impairs" benefits accruing to other countries, however, it could be
prohibited under the nullification and impairment provision.
A further source of confusion revolves around the difficulty
presented by interpreting the exceptions provided to less-developed
countries under GATT's principles, objectives, commitments, and
joint action requirements. These articles do not indicate what trade
practices developing countries are obligated to tolerate despite the
fact that such practices are nullifying or impairing their rights under
GATT.237 Thus, it is unclear whether developed countries must ac-
quiesce in violations of GATT even though such actions may "nullify
or impair" the benefits that those countries would otherwise receive.
This acquiescence may be required as a result of the obligations these
countries face in aiding in the economic development of less-devel-
oped countries.238
There is little history behind the nullification and impairment
provision to aid in its interpretation. 39 The ambiguities and deficien-
cies in the provisions of this Article further the difficulty of interpre-
tation. It is necessary, therefore, to add provisions addressing less-
developed and developing countries which clarify the applicability of
the nullification and impairment Article.2 ' This provision or
234. Art. XVlII, supra note 81, at paras. 2, 9.
235. This ambiguity is more pronounced with regard to trade measures which deviate from
those provisions of GATT relating to other than restrictive trade practices.
236. Id. at para. 1(c).
237. Art. XXXVI, supra note 52, and arts. XXXVII-XXXVIII, supra note 61.
238. See supra notes 52 and 61.
239. Hudec, supra note 206, at 463.
240. This clarification is especially necessary regarding the applicability of Article XXIII
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amendment should state when the nullification and impairment pro-
vision takes precedence over the privileges given to less-developed
and developing countries.
The articles of GATT which permit less-developed and develop-
ing countries to take measures to aid in their economic develop-
ment24 ' are likely intended to take precedence over the nullification
and impairment provision. This is because GATT's primary objec-
tive is to develop the economies of less-developed and developing
countries.242 To meet this objective the amendment or provision re-
garding nullification and impairment should read:
No provision of this Article diminishes the rights of those coun-
tries granted preferences under this Agreement from taking full
advantage of such preferences. No provision of this Article is to
be construed as having precedence over, or precluding, any prefer-
ence granted to less-developed member nations nor developing
member nations under any other Article of this Agreement.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Comment analyzed five GATT articles and their effect on
the countertrade practices of less-developed and developing coun-
tries. The analysis of each of these articles was made in light of the
special consideration GATT gives to these countries. This considera-
tion arises out of the GATT objective of developing the economies of
less-developed and developing countries. Also, GATT imposes par-
ticular requirements on the developed contracting parties to aid the
less-developed and developing countries in economic development.243
Because of this, less-developed and developing countries can adopt
trade practices and otherwise violate GATT provisions provided, this
is done to further their own economic development.
The most favored nation provision contains an ambiguity con-
cerning whether less-developed and developing countries can adopt
countertrade requirements in spite of their discriminatory nature.
244
A proposed amendment was presented which helps to clarify this
ambiguity.2 45 GATT's requirements regarding the publication and
to countertrade practices. This need exists because of countertrade's dual effect of aiding coun-
tries in economic development while, at the same time, restricting and injuring the trade of
other, especially developed, countries.
241. Art. XVIII, supra note 81.
242. GUPTA, supra note 26, at 24-28.
243. Art. XXXVI, supra note 52; arts. XXXVII-XXXVIII, supra note 61.
244. See supra notes 52-77 and accompanying text.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 78-82.
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administration of trade regulations were also analyzed.24 6 It was
then determined that countries cannot impose countertrade regula-
tions without publishing them.247
An analysis of GATT's prohibition on quantitative restrictions
was conducted with regard to how countertrade requirements consti-
tute quantitative restrictions, 248 and whether they can be imposed by
less-developed and developing countries. 249 An ambiguity was found
and a proposed amendment offered to aid in clarification.250
GATT's article regarding subsidies was analyzed as to whether
countertrade practices constitute subsidies25 and, if so, when and
how they can be imposed.25 2 It was also found to contain ambigui-
ties and an amendment was proposed to clarify them.253
Finally, the provisions concerning the nullification and impair-
ment of the rights of GATT's member nations were analyzed.254
There, a proposed amendment was offered to clarify whether
countertrade practices can be imposed by less-developed and devel-
oping countries despite the fact that the rights of other member na-
tions are being nullified or impaired.2 5
Edward Michael Rieu*
246. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 101-20, 128-53.
250. See supra text accompanying note 153.
251. See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 165-77 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 178-203 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 204-10 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 216-42 and accompanying text.
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